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Summary 
 
The influence that is exerted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (”CJEU”) on 
national legislations is uncontroversial. Everybody is aware of the direct influence that the 
CJEU obtains whenever it for example declares a national provision incompatible with EU 
law and therefore invalid. However, there exists also an indirect influence of its judicature 
which has the same power to modify the Member States´ laws. Even though the CJEU does 
not officially declare national rules to contravene EU-law and demands a change in a Member 
State´s system, sometimes this is exactely what happens after a line of judgements - and not 
just casually. 
 
This indirect influence is clearly evident as far as minimum capital requirements for private 
limited companies are concerned. The CJEU`s judgements on the freedom of establishment 
enabled the movement of companies in the EU. This possibility led to a competition of 
systems which made some Member States` private limited companies less attractive for 
founders than others. One reason for the disadvantage are minimum capital requirements. 
This is why especially countries demanding a high amount of such a capital, felt pressured 
into changing their laws governing limited liability companies. Two examples that illustrate 
this indirect impact of the CJEU`s judicature over the time vividely are Germany and Austria. 
Germany carried out modifications in 2008 by introducing a new legal form for private 
limited companies, which does not demand any minimum capital, next to the regular form for 
companies with limited liability, the GmbH. In Austria changes concerning the law governing 
limited liability companies are planned to be implemented this year. Here, the minimum 
capital requirement is going to be lowered to less than a third of the current amount. 
 
In order to be able to determine how exactely this indirect influence of the CJEU´s judicature 
looked like and how much power it possessed in Germany, respectively is about to have in 
Austria, the conducted and the planned reform as well as the situation before the judgements 
will be examined in this thesis. 
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Abbreviations 
 
CJEU or 
Court  Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
GesRÄG Gesellschaftsrechts – Änderungsgesetz 
 
GmbH  Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung; name for private limited companies in 
  Germany and in Austria 
 
GmbHG GmbH-Gesestz; name for the law governing the GmbHs in Germany and in 
  Austria 
 
Limited Private limited company by shares; private limited company in the United  
  Kingdom 
 
MikraTraG Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen und zur Förderung der Transparenz 
  im GmbH-Recht 
 
Mindest- 
kapitalG  Gesetz zur Neureglung des Mindestkapitals der GmbH 
 
MoMiG Gesetz zur Modernisierung und Verhinderung von Missbräuchen im GmbH- 
  Recht 
 
SARL  Société à la responsabilité limitée; private limited company in France 
 
SARL  Sociedad a responsabilidad limitada; private limited company in Spain 
 
SNLE   Sociedad limitada nueva empresa; private limited company in Spain 
 
SPE  Societas Privata Europaea 
 
TFEU  Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
 
UG  Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt); private limited company in 
  Germany 
 
 
In the Bibliography (Austrian and German journals) 
 
BC  Zeitschrift für Bilanzierung, Rechnungswesen und Controlling 
 
DStR  Deutsches Steuerrecht 
 
EuZW  Europäische Zeitung für Wirtschaftsrecht 
 
GeS or GES Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht und angrenzendes Steuerrecht 
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GesRZ  Der Gesellschafter - Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 
 
JA  Juristische Arbeitsblätter 
 
NZG  Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 
 
NJW   Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
 
wbl  Wirtschaftsbetriebliche Blätter 
 
ZIP  Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose  
The judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU” or “Court”) have a 
great impact on the Member States´ legislations. This direct influence of the CJEU´s 
judicature on certain provisions of national laws is for example demonstrated by the outcome 
of preliminary rulings: the Member States have to change their rules or accept something 
which might not be valid according to their national rules.  
It is interesting to observe that the Court´s judicature does not just possess this direct but also 
an indirect influence on national legislations. Member States might consider changing their 
legal provisions not because it was ruled in a judgement to do so but because of the 
development that followed this judgement, which put them in a less favourable position in 
comparison to others.  
 
Minimum capital requirements for private limited companies in several Member States are 
good examples to illustrate such a situation. After the CJEU´s judgements on the freedom of 
establishment, or in other words the “free movement of companies”, starting with the Daily 
Mail1 and particularly the Centros2-case in 1999, a still ongoing discussion began about 
lowering or abandoning the minimum capital requirements for private limited liability 
companies in the European Union. The debate already led to changes in the German system 
and will probably lead briefly to changes in the Austrian legislation. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how strong the indirect influence of the Court´s 
judicature on national legislations is and remains to be over time by using the example of 
minimum capital requirements for private limited companies3 in Germany and Austria.  
  
                                                 
1
 Case C-81/87  The Queen v.H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and 
General Trust plc [1988] ECR 5483. 
2
 Case C- 212/97 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459. 
3
 In the following the term whenever the term “minimum capital” or “minimum capital requirements” stands 
alone, it shall always refer to this legally prescribed capital for private limited companies. 
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1.2 Method, Concept, Theories 
I would describe the method which will be used as the “traditional legal method”. It applies an 
analytical approach to the subject. This means that the relevant case law and literature 
concerning the topic will be described at first. In the next step advantages and disadvantages 
will be examined, a critical analysis will be carried out and finally a conclusion will be drawn. 
 
In order to examine the topic the CJEU´s most relevant judgements on the freedom of 
establishment - Daily Mail4, Centros, Inspire Art5, Überseering6, Cartesio7 and VALE8 -  are 
examined more closely and their impact on company law in the EU will be discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
  
The freedom of establishment for companies is regulated in Article 49 Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) and Article 54 TFEU.  
Art 49 TFEU lays down that “restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a 
Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited”. Art 54 TFEU 
makes clear that not only natural persons but also corporations can rely on this freedom. 
Consequently, any company validly established under the laws of a Member State and 
recognized as being an EU company, is to be treated the same way as a natural person for the 
purposes of the exercise of freedom of establishment.9 
 
In order to enable a discussion concerning the indirect influence of the CJEU´s judgements 
regarding the freedom of establishment on national legislations the seat theory and the 
incorporation theory will be used. The distinction between these two theories is important 
because the impact is different for Member States using the seat theory than for those 
applying the incorporation theory. 
                                                 
4
 In the following the judgements, which are relevant for the topic and are cited here in Chapter 1, will not be 
cited again when nothing particular form the cases is mentioned but just their name. 
5
 Case C- 167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. [2003] ECR I-10155. 
6
 Case C- 209/00 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) [2002] ECR 
I- 9919. 
7
 Case C- 210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] ECR I-9641. 
8
 Case C- 378/10 VALE Építési Kft [2012]. 
9
 John Armour and Wolf Georg Ringe, ‘European Company Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and crisis’ (2011) 48 
Common Market Law Review 124, 130. 
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The seat theory or real seat doctrine states that a company is governed by the rules of the state 
where the main seat is genuinely located.10 This means that the connecting factor determining 
the law applicable to companies is their seat of administration.11 The real seat doctrine is used 
in most continental Member States, like Spain, France, Belgium and also Austria as well as 
Germany.12 The main argument in favour of this theory is that when not using this doctrine 
the domestic company law which is mostly affected by the activities of the resident 
companies would be circumvented.13 
The incorporation doctrine, on the contrary, regards the place of registration as the decisive 
factor and is mainly used in the United Kingdom, Ireland, The Netherlands14 and Denmark15. 
The advantages of this theory are legal certainty since the place of registration can be easily 
discovered as well as the promotion of the mobility of companies. 16 
 
After having defined the EU legal background, the indirect influence that the CJEU´s 
judgements had, alternatively will have on the minimum capital requirements for private 
limited companies in Germany and Austria, which are named Gesellschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung (“GmbH”) in both states, will be described in Chapter 3.  
In this context it should be mentioned that Germany and Austria are chosen because they are 
both applying the real seat theory. Moreover, they obtain high minimum capital requirements. 
Furthermore, in both countries discussions about the maintaining of this legal instrument 
started due to the influence of the CJEU´s judicature on the freedom of establishment. 
 
In the part dealing with the German development, scholars arguments for and against the legal 
instrument of minimum capital requirements will be reviewed and the discussion about its 
necessity as well as the impact of the CEJU´s judgements on this debate and the reform of the 
German system will be evaluated. 
 
                                                 
10
 Kristin Nemeth, ‘The Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), Case 6 Ob 123/99b, Judgement of 15 
July 1999’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1277, 1278. 
11Wulf-Henning Roth, ‘Case C- 212/97, Centros Ltd. V. Erhevers- og Selskabsstyrelsen, Judgement of March 
1999, Full Court (2000)’ 37 Common Market Law Review 147. 
12
 Mathias Siems, ‘Convergence, Competition, Centros and Conflicts of law: European Company Law in the 21st 
century’ (2002) European Law Review 47, 48. 
13
 Siems (n 12) 49. 
14
 Siems (n 12) 48. 
15
 Wolfgang Zöllner, ‘Konkurrenz für inländische Kapitalgesellschaften durch ausländische Rechtsträger, 
insbesondere durch die englisch Private Limited Company’ (2006) 1 GmbHRundschau 1. 
16
 Siems (n 12) 48. 
   7 
 
In the next step a closer look will be taken at the Austrian situation. Also here, the current 
status quo concerning the minimum capital requirement as well as the discourse about it and 
the forthcoming reform will be examined. It will be demonstrated how strong the indirect 
influence of the CJEU`s judicature on this discussion still remains to be. 
 
At the end, in the final Chapter 4, a conclusion will be drawn summarizing the main aspects, 
showing the most important outcome of this thesis and pointing out how important the 
CJEU´s judicature on the freedom of establishment was and still is for national legislations 
especially as far as minimum capital requirements are concerned. 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
Some of the judgements that are also related to the freedom of establishment like Marks & 
Spencer17, Cadburry Schweppes18, National Grid Indus19 and Della Valle20, are not described 
in Chapter 2.  
This is due to the fact that I want to focus on the milestone-judgements that according to me 
describe the different points of view the CJEU took over the years. In this context is should 
also be stated that the judgements, that are not considered, are tax-cases and their important 
outcome for company law in general is clarified in the judgements which are described. 
Moreover, the current literature, which is relevant for my topic, almost exclusively refers to 
the mentioned judgements. 
 
The examination of the indirect influence of the CJEU´s legislation concerning minimum 
capital requirements is limited to Germany and Austria. Other countries, like for example 
France or Spain which are also affected by the CJEU´s judgements on the freedom of 
establishment, are not taken into consideration. 
This can be explained firstly by the limited amount of time given for research. Moreover, 
according to me, Germany and Austria are the best examples to illustrate the indirect 
influence on the discussion about minimum capital requirements. In addition to this, the 
                                                 
17
 Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey (Her Majesty´s Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-10837. 
18
 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2006] ECR I-7995. 
19
 Case C- 371/10 National Grid Indus BV v. Inspecteur van de Belastningdiesnt Rijnmond / kantoor Rotterdam 
[2011]. 
20
 Case C-380/11 DI.VI. Finanziaria di Diego della Valle & C.SapA v. Adminstration des contributations en 
matière d´impôts [2012]. 
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German and Austrian laws governing limited liability companies are very similar. However, 
after the changes have been carried out in Germany some years passed until reforms are 
planned in Austria now. This illustrates very well how the influence of the CJEU´s 
judgements is still strong even though the tenor in the judicature might seem to have changed. 
Additionally, these two countries illustrate how similar national legislations can find different 
solutions to deal with the indirect impact. 
In this context it should be mentioned, that the examination is more focused on the German 
changes, since these modifications have already been carried out and the Austrian reform is - 
at the time of the writing of this thesis - just planned. Moreover, the debates of German and 
Austrian scholars concerning the advantages and disadvantages of minimum capital 
requirements are quite similar. 
In addition to this, only the modifications concerning minimum capital requirements will be 
examined when discussing the reforms in Germany and Austria. Additional changes that have 
also been carried out as part of the reforms resulting from the indirect influence of the CJEU´s 
judgements like other alterations of the German law governing private limited companies or 
planned amendments of other laws, like insolvency law or tax law in Austria, are left out.  
 
Besides, in the Bibliography sometimes just surnames are used and first names left out. This 
is done because in the original source the forename was not stated. Moreover, in some cases, 
not the most actual version of literature, for example German commentaries, is used. This is 
due to the fact done because the literature has been current at the time the reforms have been 
carried out and hence are more suitable to describe the situation at that time. 
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2 CJEU´s Judgements 
2.1 Introduction 
The Court ruled in several judgements which all were brought to it by preliminary ruling 
procedures about the mobility of companies within the EU and the extent to which they can 
rely on the freedom of establishment.21 
In order to be able to discuss the indirect influence of the CJEU´s judicature on minimum 
capital requirements in Germany as well as in Austria and, also on the real seat theory in 
general, a closer look has to be taken at the most relevant judgements on the freedom of 
establishment. Therefore, these judgements as well as their impact are examined more closely 
in this chapter.  
At first a short overview of the cases will be given as well as the legal question that was 
answered is described. The second part will deal with their outcome and interpretation. 
2.2 Overview of the judgements 
2.2.1 Daily Mail 
Daily Mail, which was decided in 1988, was the first case about the freedom of establishment 
and dealt with a company´s right to emigration.22 It concerned the intended transfer of the 
central management and control of a company governed by the law of the United Kingdom to 
the Netherlands, which was motivated by less favourable British tax rules. The question was 
whether the denial of the consent for ceasing to be a resident for tax purposes in the United 
Kingdom by the British Treasury breached Community Law or not.23 
 
The Court held that this refusal was not a violation of EU law by reasoning that companies 
were creatures of national law.24 In this respect, the CJEU did not rule that companies were 
                                                 
21
 Marek Szydłov, ‘Case C-210/06. CARTESIO Oktató es Szolgaltato bt, Judgements of the Grand Chamber of 
the Court of Justice of 16 December 2008, not yet reported’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 703.  
22 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four Freedoms (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
2010) 320. 
23
 Daniel Zimmer, ‘Case C- 167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 
judgement of 30 September 2003, nyr’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 1127 f. 
24
 Zimmer (n 23) 1128. 
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restricted from changing their seat of residence, but that the Member States were allowed to 
impose restrictions on emigrating companies.25 
2.2.2 Centros 
In its Centros-judgement from 1999, which dealt with an immigration topic,26 the Court took 
a different approach and left more room to the freedom of establishment.27 
Centros Ltd. was a company incorporated under the law of the United Kingdom by two 
Danish citizens, Mr. and Mrs. Bryde, who were the only shareholders. The Brydes wanted to 
open a branch in Denmark at a time when Centros had never traded in the United Kingdom. 
The Danish registrar found that the aim was not opening a branch but creating a principal 
business establishment in Denmark and therefore refused the registration.28 The Danish 
Authorities furthermore argued that Centros actually just intended to avoid the Danish rules 
governing the formation of companies like for example the minimum share capital.29  
 
In this case the referring court asked if the assessment of the Danish Authorities was contrary 
to Union Law. The CJEU came to the conclusion that a Member State cannot refuse the 
registration of a branch of a company that was formed in accordance with the law of another 
Member State, where it has its registered office.30 
2.2.3 Inspire Art 
In 2003, in Inspire Art, which was also dealing with the immigration of a company31, the 
CJEU repeated its ruling in Centros, this time in respect of Dutch rules on minimum capital 
requirements and directors´ liability. These norms applied to companies deliberately 
established in another Member State to avoid Dutch rules but carrying out their activities 
mainly in the Netherlands. 32 
 
                                                 
25
 Barnard (n 22) 320. 
26
 Zimmer (n 23) 1129. 
27
 Zimmer (n 23) 1127. 
28
 Barnard (n 22) 329 f. 
29
 Zimmer (n 23) 1128. 
30
 Zimmer (n 23) 1128 f. 
31
 Weller, ‘Einleitung’ in Münchner Kommentar zum GmbHG, vol 1(1st edn, C.H.Beck 2010) marginal 
number 356. 
32
 Barnard (n 22) 331. 
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Inspire Art Ltd. was formed under the law of the United Kingdom. Its sole director lived in 
the Netherlands and was authorized to act alone and independently in the name of the 
company. Inspire Art started trading in 2000 and had a branch in Amsterdam. It was 
registered at the Chamber of Commerce without any indication of being a “formally foreign 
company” which was obligatory according to the Dutch law on formally foreign companies.33 
Moreover, such companies were obliged to provide the nominal capital required for a 
company with limited liability under Dutch law. If these conditions were not met, the 
directors were personally liable for the performance of the company´s contractual 
obligations.34 
 
The CJEU stated that the fact that the company was formed in the United Kingdom to evade 
Dutch company law, which was considered stricter, did not deprive the company of its right to 
take advantage of the provisions of the TFEU on the freedom of establishment. The only 
exception to this would be the proven abuse in an individual case.35 
2.2.4 Überseering 
Überseering, which was decided in 2002, was a case that concerned an immigration topic as 
well. The Dutch company Überseering sued the German Company NCC for defective work 
carried out by NCC in Germany on its behalf.36 The action was declared inadmissible both in 
the first and second instance. The reason given by the German Courts was that after being 
founded according to Dutch law, all shares of Überseering had been acquired by two German 
nationals who were residing in Germany. Consequently, the central place of management and 
therefore also the seat had been transferred to Germany. Since Überseering did not comply 
with the German rules governing the formation of a company, it did not possess legal 
personality, hence also did not have the capacity to bring court action in Germany.37 
 
The CJEU considered the German measures, which were basically an outcome of the seat 
theory, as a restriction of the free movement of establishment. Member States had to respect 
the legal personality which a company obtained according to its state of incorporation. It 
                                                 
33
 EU Focus, ‘Restrictions on establishment discussed’ (2003) 131 EU Focus 23. 
34
 Zimmer (n 23) 1130, 1131. 
35
 Zimmer (n 23) 1133. 
36
 Barnard (n 22) 332. 
37
 Peter Dyrberg, ‘Full free movement of companies in the European Community at last?’ (2003) 28 (4) 
European Law Review 528, 533. 
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could be concluded from this statement that in regard to the acceptance of the legal 
personality of a foreign company the incorporation theory had to be applied even in countries 
following the real seat doctrine.38 
 
2.2.5 Cartesio 
In 2008, the Court´s judgement in Cartesio followed. Like Daily Mail it concerned a 
company´s right to departure. Cartesio was a company formed under Hungarian law and listed 
in the Hungarian commercial register. Its established office and real seat were in Hungary as 
well. Cartesio wanted to move its seat to Italy and applied to change this also in the 
commercial register. This application was rejected on the basis of the fact that it was not 
allowed according to Hungarian company law to transfer the seat to another country and to 
continue being a subject to Hungarian law.39 
 
In this judgement the CJEU recalled its statement form Daily Mail that companies were 
creatures of national law which only existed by virtue of the national legislation.40 
Furthermore, the Court left the power to decide which connecting factor it desired for a 
company to be established under its law to the Member State. Moreover, the state was 
authorized to determine that the company had to cease to exist if it moved its seat to another 
Member State and therefore lost the connecting factor described.41 Therefore, the company 
could not rely on the freedom of establishment. Hence, Hungary did not restrict the freedom 
of establishment in this case.42 
2.2.6 VALE 
VALE, the CJEU latest judgement on corporate mobility in the EU43 from 2012 dealt with an 
immigration case: VALE Costruzioni Srl, an Italian private limited company, wanted to 
transfer its seat and its business to Hungary. For this reason it asked to be removed from the 
commercial register, which was carried out by the Italian authorities as “removal and transfer 
of seat”. Nine months later the former director of VALE and another natural person wanted to 
                                                 
38
 Weller (n 31) marginal number 352. 
39
 Szydłov (n 21) 704. 
40
 Szydłov (n 21) 707. 
41
 Weller (n 31) marginal number 363. 
42
 Weller (n 31) marginal number 364. 
43
 Thomas Biermeyer, ‘Shaping the space of cross-border conversions in the EU. Between right and autonomy: 
VALE’
 
(2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 571. 
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establish the Hungarian VALE Építési Kft. They adopted the statute as well as paid the 
required share capital according to Hungarian law and applied to the competent authority for 
the registration of the company. In the application, it was requested to refer to the Italian 
VALE as a predecessor.44 This request had the objective of accomplishing a cross-border 
conversion from an Italian Srl into a Hungarin Kft. 45 According to Hungarian law a 
conversion was just possible for domestic companies and the old legal entity could be referred 
to as a predecessor in the commercial register. For foreign companies these possibilities did 
not exist.46 
The first relevant topic was whether prohibiting a foreign EU company to convert into a 
Hungarian company was a violation of Art 49 and 54 TFEU. The CJEU came to the 
conclusion that allowing company conversions at a national level but not across EU borders 
was an unjustifiable restriction of the freedom of establishment.47  
The next important issue concerned the realisation of conversions and if a Member State 
could demand the domestic provisions on conversions to be applied also for cross-border 
conversions. The Court ruled that this did not violate the freedom of establishment in general. 
However, the principles of effectiveness and equivalence obliged the host Member State to 
designate the predecessor in law and take the relevant documents of the Member State of 
origin into account.48 
2.3 Outcome and Interpretation 
The development of the CJEU´s judicature on the freedom of establishment is interesting and 
sometimes rather surprising in the sense that it is not directly following previous judgements. 
I suppose this is related to the fact that these judgements touch a very sensitive issue for 
Member States. Especially the question whether the seat theory is compatible with EU law or 
not, seems to be a “hot potato” in EU company law. 
 
                                                 
44
 Peter Kindler, ‘Der reale Niederlassungsbegriff nach dem VALE-Urteil des EuGH’ [2012] EuZW 888. 
45
 Biermeyer (n 43) 572. 
46
 Biermeyer (n 43) 572, 573. 
47
 Biermeyer (n 43) 574 ff. 
48
 Kindler (n 44) 890. 
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In its first judgement in this matter, in Daily Mail, which dealt with a question about the 
emigration of a company, the Court took a very restrictive approach.49 It emphasized the 
importance of mutual recognition of corporate laws. Based on the judgement in this case the 
real seat theory seemed to be fully compatible with Union law and the discussion about the 
use of the real seat or incorporation doctrine was left to the Member States.50 
Then years later the Court took a different view.51 The Centros-judgement was ground-
breaking and lead to huge responses in literature. It was widely assumed that a new era of the 
freedom of establishment had started.52 The question at stake was whether the real seat 
doctrine would be classified as an unnecessary and unjustified restriction to the freedom of 
establishment53 and whether it could be maintained within Union law.  
 
This question was not answered until the judgements of Überseering and Inspire Art.54 The 
Court then followed Centros in Inspire Art55 as well as in Überseering 56 which led to an 
extension of the freedom of establishment.57 However, also in these judgements the CJEU did 
not put an official end to the seat theory.58 
It should be kept in mind that Centros, Inspire Art and Überseering concerned the 
immigration of companies. It followed from these judgements, that even if the home Member 
State could impose restrictions for leaving companies, the host Member State could not do the 
same, if the company had been validly formed in another Member State. The host Member 
State had to judge immigrating companies according to the rules applied in their home 
jurisdiction. Hence, it had to use the incorporation principle for these companies.59 
Consequently, this meant that even if not officially declared invalid, the seat theory was de 
facto not applicable in such circumstances any more. 
 
                                                 
49
 John Armour and Wolf Georg Ringe, ‘European Company Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and crisis’ (2011) 48 
Common Market Law Review 124, 130. 
50
 Armour and Ringe (n 49) 133. 
51
 Armour and Ringe (n 49) 134. 
52
 Dyrberg (n 37) 531. 
53
 Wulf-Henning  Roth, ‘Case C- 212/97, Centros Ltd. V. Erhevers- og Selskabsstyrelsen, Judgement of March 
1999, Full Court’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 147, 150. 
54
 Lang, ‘Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht’in Hildegard Ziemons and Carsten Jaeger, Beck´scher Online-
Kommentar GmbHG (13th edn, C.H.Beck 01.12.2012) <http.beck-online.beck.de> accessed 22.05.2013 marginal 
number 16. 
55
 EU Focus (n 11) 24. 
56
 Armour and Ringe (n 8).135. 
57
 Zimmer (n 23) 1333. 
58
 Dyrberg (n 37) 528. 
59
 Weller (n 31) marginal number 356. 
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Also in its next judgment, Cartesio, the Court did not abandon the real seat theory. On the 
contrary, the CJEU ruled according to its Daily Mail-doctrine and stated again that companies 
were creatures of national law. Member States were free to determine that companies needed 
a connecting factor, like the seat, in order to be governed by their company law. This 
surprised all scholars who believed that the Court would continue its line of reasoning of 
Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art and also apply it to emigrating companies.60 
 
In a next step, the Court ruled in 2012 in VALE, which although dealing with a conversion 
case, could be seen as Cartesio´s successor. It was much anticipated in the hope that it would 
clarify the extent of corporate mobility in the EU and explain the outcome of Cartesio.61  
In VALE, the Court stated that companies had the right to cross-border conversion. This 
judgement also entailed the rule that companies seeking to carry out such a conversion had to 
comply with the connecting factor that was required by the host Member State. Companies 
that wanted to convert to companies in countries following the real seat doctrine would 
therefore generally have to shift their central administration to this jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
the CJEU stated explicitly that this right should just be granted if an actual economic activity 
through a permanent establishment for an indefinite period was pursued in the host country.62 
Moreover, companies could just convert if they fulfilled the establishment-criteria of their 
home Member State.63 
The CJEU did not state clearly that it wanted the principles of VALE just to be applied to 
conversion-scenarios, so some scholars argue that it should be generally used for 
establishment-cases.64 Personally, I consider this argumentation to be questionable and a look 
will have to be taken at future judgements concerning this topic to make a statement like this.  
What can be determined definitely is that through giving more autonomy to national 
legislations within the limits of effectiveness and equivalence, VALE created another layer of 
rules in the already existing “jungle of rules” on cross-border corporate mobility.65 
 
To sum up, in all its judgements on the freedom of establishment the CJEU has never 
abolished the real seat theory officially. Nevertheless, it was very clear in its early case law – 
Centros, Inspire Art and Überseering- that particularly for immigrating companies the real 
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seat doctirne could be considered as a de facto restriction of the freedom of establishment. At 
that time, this situation enabled the so called “competition of the systems” between the 
different Member States´ legal forms,66 which was very well capable of indirectly influencing 
national legislations. An example that illustrates this vividly is given by Germany where 
changes of the law governing private limited companies were initiated because of this 
competition. This impact will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Even though some scholars argue that the situation is different now and that in its VALE-
judgement the CJEU has abandoned its rulings in Centros, Inspire Art and Überseering,67 I am 
personally still considering the influence of their core statements on national law quite strong. 
Member States following the real seat doctrine still feel this competition of systems. This can 
be demonstrated by the example of Austria, which is planning to change its law governing 
private limited companies for this reason now.68 Details will be described in Chapter 3 as 
well. 
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3 Indirect Influence 
3.1 Introduction 
As was concluded in Chapter 2 the Court´s judgements on the freedom of establishment made 
the competition of systems in the European Union possible. The enabling of such a 
competition had a tremendous influence on national legislations. One example that illustrates 
this influence very well is the minimum capital requirement for private limited companies. In 
other words, the question asked by national experts whether there can be a justification for 
this requirement in the light of such a competition. 
 
There exists no general EU provision concerning the capitalization standards for private 
limited companies. Moreover, the Court did not rule that minimum capital requirements were 
contravening EU law in its judgements on the freedom of establishment. In Inspire Art for 
example the CJEU mentioned expressly that the Dutch provisions regarding share capital 
were not considered to be in conflict with the freedom of establishment as guaranteed in the 
TFEU.69 Still, due to the competition of systems some Member States felt pressurised to 
change their rules. Discussions started and modifications followed or are about to follow. 
 
This indirect impact of the CJEU´s judgements on the freedom of establishment on national 
laws is very well illustrated by the examples of Germany and Austria which will therefore be 
examined in this Chapter. 
3.2 Minimum capital requirements in the EU 
Before being able to commence with the description of the Court´s judicature´s indirect 
influence on minimum capital requirements, a brief introduction to this legal instrument will 
be given. In addition to this, its usage in the European Union will be described shortly. 
 
                                                 
69
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The minimum capital requirement for private limited companies is the legally prescribed 
amount of money that shareholders have to invest in their company.70 As the name indicates, 
shareholders are obliged to raise this sum at any rate71 but can of course always decide that 
the share capital should be higher than what the legislator demands as a minimum. Since 
shareholders gain the benefit of not being personally liable when choosing the legal form of a 
private limited company, the minimum capital constitutes the amount they are actually legally 
responsible for.72 
 
In Germany the minimum capital requirement for private limited companies is laid down in 
§ 5 of the law governing the GmbHs, the GmbH-Gesetz (“GmbHG”), and amounts to 
€ 25.000,00. This sum can either be paid in money or in investments in kind. If it is decided to 
use just money contributions, one half of this amount, namely € 12.500,00, has to be paid 
when registering the company.73  
Furthermore, during the reform carried out in 2008 a new private limited company, the 
Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt) (“UG”), was introduced in § 5a GmbHG next 
to the GmbH which only requires a minimum capital of € 1,00. 
 
In Austria, currently € 35.000,00 are demanded as minimum capital according to § 6 of the 
Austrian GmbHG, but a reform has been initiated that intends to reduce it. It should be 
mentioned here, that also in Austria just half of the required capital has to be paid, when only 
money contributions are used, as is stated in § 6a GmbHG. 
 
In comparison to other countries in the EU these minimum capital requirements are very 
high.74 Austria even obtains the highest legally prescribed capital of all the EU Member 
States75 directly followed by Germany as number two – at least for the regular GmbH.76  
If countries decide to demand a minimum capital, it is in the main part distinctly lower. This 
is for example the case in Italy, Belgium or Spain.77 The Spanish sociedad a responsabilidad 
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limitada (“SARL”) as well as the sociedad limitada nueva empresa (“SLNE”) both demand 
just about € 3.000,00.78 In 2013, the average minimum capital requirement for private limited 
companies in the EU amounts to € 8.000,00.79 
 
Some Member States like England with its Private limited company by shares (“Limited”) 
and France with the société à la responsabilité limitée (“SARL”) formally do not require any 
minimum capital at all. 80  
 
As far as minimum capital requirements and the laws governing private limited companies are 
concerned, a lot of countries were and still are influenced by the outcome of the CJEU´s 
judgements.  
France, for example, was the first Member State to react to the Court´s judicature. It lowered 
the minimum capital requirement for its SARL from € 7.500,00 to € 1,00 in 2003. Also in 
2003, Spain introduced the SNLE next to the Spanish SARL. Both legal forms obtain the 
same minimum capital, but the newly introduced company enables a quicker establishment. 
Now, also the Netherlands consider changing their minimum capital requirement.81  
 
In the following, it will be discussed what indirect influence the Court´s judgements on the 
freedom of establishment had on the German, respectively will have on the Austrian system 
regarding minimum capital requirements. 
 
3.3 Germany 
In Germany, the discussion about the minimum capital requirement was mainly carried out 
after the judgements in Centros, Inspire Art and Überseering, which made the traditional 
German GmbH suddenly subject to competition with other legal forms in the European 
Union. Finally, the German GmbH-System was reformed at the end of 2008 with the Gesetz 
zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und Verhinderung von Missbräuchen (“MoMiG”). The 
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minimum capital requirement was not the only change that was made in the MoMiG but it 
was the core issue in the legal discourse.82 
3.3.1 Competition of systems 
The CJEU´s judgements on the freedom of establishment made the competition between the 
different legal forms in the EU possible.83 At least in some countries, especially those who 
followed the real seat doctrine, Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art changed the environment 
for establishing new companies completely. 
 
In Germany, an intense discussion regarding the competing power of the German GmbH with 
other legal forms was started, especially as far as the British Limited was concerned. 84 Firstly, 
the GmbH was criticized for its complicated formal requirements during the establishment 
process. Secondly and more strongly, its relatively high minimum capital requirement was 
considered to have a bad influence on its competitiveness.85 
 
Entrepreneurs in Germany seemed extremely keen on choosing the legal form of a Limited 
when establishing a new company. According to estimations, 25.000 Limiteds had been 
founded in Germany until 2006. This meant in effect that every fourth new foundation of a 
private limited company was a Limited and not a GmbH any more.86 Founders of new 
businesses seemed to be particularly fond of the Limited because it enabled a quick and also 
“cheap” establishment in comparison with the GmbH.87  
The other possible European legal forms like the French SARL, which just demanded € 1,00 
as minimum capital as well, or the SLNE, which could be established in 48 hours, did not 
have great success in Germany at all. The most obvious explanation for this development 
could be found in language barriers. 88  
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The German scholars warned about the risks that should always be kept in mind when 
establishing a company governed by the law of another Member State. Such risks could be 
constituted for example in the costs of an English lawyer for general advice or during a 
lawsuit.89 Next to possible additional costs, critics also stated that the prestige amongst 
creditors might not be the best since a lot of these newly found Limiteds failed and went 
bankrupt.90 
 
Although the Limited therefore did not have the best reputation and the financial risks that 
could arise when choosing a Limited and not a GmbH were not to be underestimated, the 
competitive disadvantage for the GmbH - or at least the one that was assumed to be - 
remained.91 
3.3.2 Reform 
Against this background the discussion concerning a reform of the German GmbHG began 
which was finalized with the MoMiG. 
 
Before starting to describe this reform, a brief look should be taken at the history of the 
German law governing GmbHs: The German GmbHG entered into force in 1892 after just a 
short time of preparation.92 In contrast to the German law governing public companies, the so 
called Aktiengesellschaftsgesetz, the GmbHG had not been subject to constant reforms.93 
Basically, even if there had been carried out some modifications94, it had not been changed 
profoundly since its entering into force95 until the big reform, the MoMiG, in 2008.  
 
The fear that the GmbH would lose its competitiveness resulting from the wave of 
foundations of Limiteds in Germany led to a discussion about the reformation and 
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modernization of the GmbHG96 with the minimum capital requirement being the centre of this 
discourse.97 Hence, even though the GmbHG seemed to fulfil its aim over the years to the 
satisfaction of all parties involved, the competition of systems finally caused a discussion 
about its modification.  
 
As a first reaction to the GmbH being under such a great pressure the Ministry of Finance 
thought about a reduction of the minimum capital requirement to € 1,00 in the course of the 
Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen und zur Förderung der Transparenz im GmbH-
Recht (“MikraTraG”) including other changes, which was finally not even published as a 
draft.98 
 
After that, a draft of a law governing the minimum capital requirement, Gesetz zur 
Neureglung des Mindestkapitals der GmbH (“MindestkapitalG”), was published in 2005, 
which suggested a reduction of the legally prescribed minimum capital to € 10.000,00 in order 
to strengthen the GmbH´s position in the competition of legal forms in the EU and facilitate 
new foundations.99 In the end, it did not enter into force because no unanimous decision about 
the reducing of the minimum capital requirement could be taken. Moreover, scholars found 
that there was a need for other reforms as well, like for example the facilitating of the 
foundation process. All of these desired changes could be summarized with the keywords 
“modernisation”, “facilitation” and “combat of abuses”.100 
 
For this reason, in the next step the Ministry of Finance issued the first draft for the Gesetz zur 
Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und Verhinderung von Missbräuchen, the MoMiG, a law 
concerning the modernisation and combat of abuses, on the 29.05.2006. The first draft, which 
was called Referentenentwurf, was heavily rejected by the 66. German Juristentag.101 Firstly, 
the planned reduction of the minimum capital requirement to € 10.000,00 was criticised 
strongly. Secondly, the proposition of the introduction of a new legal form called 
Unternehmergründergesellschaft was opposed.102 Despite all the criticism, the 
Referentenentwurf, was used as a foundation for a changed second draft, called 
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Regierungsentwurf, which was presented on the 23. 5. 2007 but still not fully accepted. After 
parts of it have been strongly modified, it was finally decided on positvely on the 26. 6. 2008 
by the German Bundestag. The MoMiG went into force on the 1. 11. 2008.103 
3.3.3 Discussion about the minimum capital requirement 
The minimum capital requirement was the main issue in the discussion about a reform of the 
German GmbHG. In the following an overview will be given on the key points of this 
discourse. 
 
In Überseering one of the arguments of German scholars in favour of their system was that 
the seat theory should be applicable in order to ensure that a company, which was operating in 
Germany, obtained enough minimum capital in order to protect creditors and contractual 
partners.104 This illustrates vividly that minimum capital requirements were a defining feature 
of the German corporation law105 with creditor protection as the main justification for it.106 
The benefit of limited liability should just be allowed because there exists the obligation to 
possess at least this certain amount of money.107 Therefore, the justification for the legal 
instrument of minimum capital was that it constituted the counterpart to the limitation of the 
shareholders´ liability. This was also the legislator´s initial will: limited liability had to be 
bought by giving this minimum security in return.108 
 
A legally prescribed minimum capital should safeguard that the business obtained enough 
equity and prevent a quick insolvency.109 Its core aim, the protection of the company´s 
creditors, should be granted at the establishment phase and shortly after that but also when the 
company was already operating as a kind of warning system.110 Proponents of the minimum 
capital requirement argued in its favour by stating that it had to be reagarded as a basic 
equipment to start with. If a company would not possess any capital at all at the beginning of 
its economic activity, it could not operate properly and would not get any credit from third 
parties.111 In addition to this, the existing minimum capital requirement of € 25.000,00 should, 
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although it could not prevent a company from generating losses in general, function as a 
buffer in case losses occured.112 Since shareholders did not have access to this legally 
prescribed minimum capital it was an appropriate means to hinder the company´s 
insolvency.113 
 
Opponents of this legal instrument, on the other hand, considered this argumentation to be 
invalid. They concluded that creditor protection neither in the start-up phase nor during the 
regular economic activity could be guaranteed by demanding the actual minimum capital. 
Since its height was the same for every GmbH, it was not determined according to real capital 
needs. This entailed the risk that it was far too low already at the beginning of the economic 
activity and thus could not ensure that the company survived the start-up phase. Therefore, 
due to this non-individual-calculation, the probability was very high that it was not capable of 
being used as a buffer for potential losses either.114 
 
The ones in favour of it in turn described the minimum capital requirement as a 
Seriösitätsschwelle, which meant that it functioned as an indicator of how serious a business 
was to be carried out. Demanding minimum capital was considered as a means to avoid 
unserious or dubious establishments.115 Firstly, the sincerity of the founders and secondly, the 
seriousness of the purpose of the enterprise should be guaranteed.116 The willingness to raise 
at least the minimum capital could be regarded as a sign of commitment. Not everybody 
should be able to establish a GmbH, but just the ones that were serious about it.117 
 
This argumentation was also not supported by everyone. Some concluded that the founders´ 
seriousness could not be linked to an actual payment of just € 12.500,00 at least since just the 
half of the prescribed minimum capital had to be raised.118 Moreover, € 25.000,00 could not 
be regarded as a suitable indication for the economical solidity of the company.119 The critics 
used the same argumentation as for the unfeasability to grant creditor protection: Since the 
minimum capital requirement was set for every company at the same height, it was not 
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calculated according to the actual investment needs that had to be figured out on a case by 
case basis. As a consequence, not just creditor protection could not be granted but also no 
statement could be made about the seriousness of neither the founder nor the actual business 
activity.120 
 
As is shown in this discussion, a lot of arguments could be found for as well as against the 
maintaining of the actual minimum capital requirement. It seemed that once the discussion 
had started the question whether there exists the necessity of obtaining a legally prescribed 
minimum capital or not was one of the great controversies in German company law.121 
How the actual reforms looked like in the MoMiG and what the German legislator decided to 
do with the issue of minimum capital requirements at last will be described now. 
3.3.4 Changes concerning the minimum capital 
requirement 
Finally, the German legislator decided to maintain the minimum capital at the amount of 
€ 25.000,00 for the traditional GmbH but introduced a new legal form, called 
Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt) alternatively UG (haftungsbeschränkt), the 
UG, which demands solely € 1,00 as minimum capital.122 
 
3.3.4.1 Minimum capital requirement for GmbHs  
As already stated in the discussion about minimum capital requirements, the discourse about 
its necessity and utility was quite controversial. The most serious critics argued for a total 
abolishment of the instrument of minimum capital requirements123 since the obligation to pay 
such a capital in general was considered as the competitive disadvantage in comparison to the 
Limited.124 Others, who were principially content with the actual system but also wanted to 
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enhance the attractiveness of the GmbH, voted for its reduction to € 10.000,00 like it was 
planned in the MindestkapG.125   
 
Still others, by contrast, conisdered the acutal system not to reach far enough. These were the 
ones who voted for an increase by arguing that in order to safeguard the aim that setting a 
minimum capital requirement tried to achieve, it should be significantly enhanced. Only then 
a real obstacle that distinguished serious from unserious entrepreneurs could be created.126 
Related to this claim, setting the minimum capital requirement up to € 100.000,00 had been 
suggested.127 Although there were some suggestions concerning the rise of the minimum 
capital, this was never really an issue in the drafts for the reform. In the light of the 
competition of systems such an increase was generally not considered to be advisable.128 
 
Even though the Limited was regarded as the great competitor, a lot of German jurists were 
against the abolishment or even the reduction of the existing minimum legal capital. This was 
illustrated by the strong vote of the 66. German Juristentag against the Referentenentwurf, 
where a decrease to € 10.000,00 had been suggested.129 
 
Maybe the strongest reason for not abandoning minimum legal capital or lowering it to 
€ 10.000,00 was the argumentation that it was needed to show the seriousness of the founder 
or the purpose of the company, the Seriösitätsschwelle.130 It seemed that the fear that the 
“classic” GmbH would lose its image of being a reliable legal form for small and medium 
sized companies without this indicator of seriousness prevailed – at least superficially- over 
the demand for a reform.131 
 
At the end of the day, the German legislator could not bring itsself to abandon the minimum 
capital requirement, at least not for the traditional GmbH and decided to keep it at 
€ 25.000,00.132  
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3.3.4.2 Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt) 
On the one hand, the MoMiG maintained the minimum capital requirement for the regular 
GmbH officially. However, on the other hand, it introduced the Unternehmergesellschaft 
(haftungsbeschränkt) or UG (haftungsbeschränkt) in 5a GmbHG, which is a legal form for 
limited liability companies requiring only € 1,00 as minimum capital. 
 
Even though the UG has a different name it should not be considered as a completely new 
legal form existing next to the traditional GmbH or obtaining a less favourable rank133 but 
should rather be regarded as a variation of the GmbH.134 The UG is integrated in the GmbHG 
which means that all provisions governing the GmbH are applicable to it as well.135 
 
Exempted from this are only the regulations that allow the registration of the company 
without having paid the full but just the half of the share capital.136 Since the shareholders can 
choose the height of the share capital on their own, the whole amount has to be paid at the 
establishment. This constitutes one difference to the GmbH where just the half of the 
minimum capital requirement has to be raised.137 Additionally, when establishing an UG the 
share capital cannot be paid in investments in kind but only in cash.138 Moreover, it is 
obligatory that the company name of a newly established UG contains the addition 
“haftungsbeschränkt”, which means “with limited liability”.139 This should warn creditors and 
all the ones making business with an UG140 about the fact that even though shareholders can 
decide that the minimum capital amounts to just € 1,00 they are still not personally liable. 
 
The share capital of the UG can be constituted by any amount between € 1,00 at least and 
€ 24.999,00 at most. If it reaches € 25.000,00, which is the height of the GmbH´s share 
capital, it converts into a GmbH.141 Whether a new company is established as a UG or a 
GmbH is consequently just dependent on the height of the share capital.142 
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The legislator intended the UG to be used as a kind of transitory form for start-up companies 
until they could turn into “real” GmbHs. As a consequence UGs can only be established in the 
first place - no existing GmbH can be transformed into an UG.143 Due to the fact that the UG 
should function as the starter version, which becomes a GmbH later on, it is obligatory to 
build a reserve each year, which has to amount to a quarter of the annual net profit. This 
provision has to be made until a minimum capital of € 25.000,00 is reached.144  
 
Called “GmbH-light”145, “Mini-GmbH”146 or “GmbH without a minimum capital 
requirement”147, the UG should especially appeal to founders of new businesses148 and thus 
keep them from choosing the legal form of a Limited. The UG should put the GmbH in a 
better position in the competition of systems. Entrepreneurs should be convinced by the 
simplicity, velocity and cost-effectiveness of its establishment process.149 
3.3.5 Assessment of the changes 
At last, the German legislator decided to maintain the existing minimum capital for the 
regular GmbH and surprisingly did not abandon or lower it to € 10.000,00.150 When taking a 
superficial look at the MoMiG this could be interpreted as sticking to this classical legal 
instrument. The introduction of the UG, however, discounts this first impression completely. 
 
The legislator aimed at ending the dispute about the necessity of the preserving of the 
minimum capital. Moreover, it wanted to create an alternative to the Limted.151 The German 
government, on the other hand, did not want to encourage the establishing of GmbHs with a 
low share capital.152 At the end of the day, the legislator decided to preserve the existing 
minimum capital for the GmbH but establish the UG next to it, which should function as the 
German version of the Limited.153 
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The actual introduction of the UG could be regarded as a political compormise which was 
decided just very shortly before the acceptance of the draft.154 The discussion whether this 
step should be taken or not was controversial till the end.155 Since the discourse about the 
legal instrument of minimum capital requirements as already illustrated was quite 
controversial, it is not suprising that the introduction of a GmbH without demanding basically 
any such capital156 turned out to be difficult as well. The disagreement regarding this topic 
already started with the first draft, the Referentenentwurf, where the potential establishment 
of the Unternehmensgründergesellschaft had been heavily critizised .157  
 
The proponents of the UG argue that since it is regulated by German company law, it is 
definitely a better option for entrepreneurs than the Limited.158 Some scholars reason that the 
establishment of this legal form was a good compromise which is capable of enhancing the 
competitiveness of the GmbH by keeping up its prestige at the same time.159 
 
However, opponents claim that the factual abandonment of the minimum capital requirement 
by introducing the UG questions the tradtional German system, where minimum capital was 
regarded as the centre of creditor protection.160 Its critics furthermore describe the UG as a 
German experiment concerning a limited liability company without minimum capital. The 
abandonment of this legal instrument indicates that UGs are in constant potential danger of 
becoming insolvent.161 Furthermore, the opponents doubt that this abandoment will just be 
transitory like the legislator intended by demanding the building of a reserve until the 
minimum capital requirement of the GmbH is reached. They fear that this required minimum 
capital will never be raised.162 In the end, the level of creditor protection will therefore be a lot 
lower than when choosing the traditional GmbH. The fact that the GmbH is in a crisis cannot 
be used to justify the establishment of legal instrument, that leads to such a tremendous 
reduction of the level of protection. 163 
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No matter what critics say, entrepreneurs are fond of the UG. According to a report from 2012 
already over 71.000,00 UGs have been established in Germany since 2008.164 Especially 
founders in the service sector prefer the UG over the regular GmbH. Also, the experiences 
with this legal form seem to be very positive till now. Opponents were afraid that not a lot of 
the newly found UGs would last a lot longer than the establishment period.165 It has to be 
stated here that there are statistics that indicate that an outstanding high amount of these new 
foundations just exist for a short time. However, there are also others that disprove this. 
Although the UG works out better then expected, still, a part of the German scholars keeps 
being sceptical towards the legal form of the UG.166 
 
Even if some experts are sceptical about the UG, I am of the opionion that not enough time 
has passed to really judge it properly. However, I do not consider the UG and the GmbH to be 
fully equivalent. Although all provisions of the GmbHG should be applicable to the UG, I do 
not really consider these two legal forms to be at the same level. For me this is clearly 
demonstrated by the argumentation that the UG should be used as a transitory company until a 
start-up business is ready to turn into a real GmbH167 which shows that the UG should be used 
for young entrepreneurs that cannot afford to raise the minimum capital demand of 
€ 25.000,00. Once being established with a serious and sucessful business, they should turn to 
the traditional and more serious legal form. Beyond that, the circumstance that creditors and 
business partners have to be warned with the addition “haftungsbeschränkt”168 is not a sign 
that indicates equality with the traditional GmbH either. 
 
I suppose that the decision for this solution was not an easy one for the German legislator. It is 
still very much in favour of the traditional system including the minimum capital of the 
regular GmbH.169 However, although it has been a difficult compromise to make, in my mind, 
it still seems that the German legislator found a clever way out – at least for itself – and 
passed the responsibility on to others: By establishing this legal form, the legislator did not 
really take a final decision concerning the question of the maintaining or abandoning the 
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minimum capital requirement but left the decision about the importance of minimum capital 
to the founders of a new business.170 
3.3.6 Indirect Influence 
Despite the German legislator could not bring itself to make a final choice as far as the 
minimum capital requirement was concerned, the modifications that had been carried out, in 
particluar the introduction of the UG, were landmark decisions in the German law governing 
limited liability companies. The question at stake was how important the indirect influence of 
the CJEU´s legislation had been for this reform. 
In my opinion this influence was extremely strong. As a matter of fact, I would go so far to 
say that without the situation that had been created after the Court´s judgements on the 
freedom of establishment, these reforms might not have been carried out or at least would 
have been accomplished a lot later. 
It is of course possible and probable, that there had existed thoughts about reforms, especially 
regarding the minimum capital requirement, before Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art. 
This can be easily concluded from the controversy of the discussion. Still, the German as 
already mentioned GmbHG had not been reformed considerably until the CJEU´s judicature 
on the freedom of establishment made the competition of systems possible. When considering 
the time it took to finally agree to reforms, one can easily assume that the Germans were 
basically content with their system before. However, in order to be able to compete with other 
legal forms of private limited companies in the EU modifications were considered necessary 
at that time.  
It is of utmost importance in this context to bear in mind that the actual real first steps that led 
to the reform started after the CJEU´s first judgements on the freedom of establishment.171 
Hence, although the CJEU never decided that minimum capital requirements were against EU 
law, the reform was initiated by its judicature indirectly. Without these judgements the 
competition of systems would not have been possible. And it was this competition that led to 
a competitive disadvantage of the GmbH, its rivalry with the Limited and ultimately to the 
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reform. This background was also officially mentioned as an explanation for the need of 
reforms.172 
However, not just because of the official explanatory notes on the MoMiG this influence was 
obvious. As described, the competitiveness with foreign legal forms, and of course 
particularly with the Limited, was pointed out in the reasoning of experts that were in favour 
of the abandoning as well as the reducing of the legally prescribed minimum capital. Finally, 
it was also referred to in the literature concerning the introduction of the UG.  
 
To conclude, the reforms carried out in Germany in relation to the minimum capital 
requirement for private limited companies illustrate vividly what indirect influence the 
CJEU´s judicature can have on national legislations. 
 
This influence is still very strong even post Cartesio and VALE, which can be demonstrated 
by the example of Austria. Five years after the German system has been modified due to the 
competition of systems Austria is in the process of changing its rules governing the legal 
instrument of minimum capital now in 2013 as well. Therefore, in the next part this 
forthcoming reform will be discussed. 
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3.4 Austria 
Austria still, as already mentioned, obtains the highest minimum capital requirement, namely 
€ 35.000,00 for private limited companies in the European Union.173 
This situation is about to change. It is planned to reduce the legally prescribed minimum 
capital to € 10.000,00. A draft concerning a change in Austrian company law, which entails a 
modification of the GmbH and is therefore also named GmbH-Reform, the so called 
Gesellschaftsrechts-Änderungsgesetz 2013 (“GesRÄG”) where the GmbHG next to other 
laws, like insolvency law and tax law will be modified, has been issued and shall enter into 
force on the 01.07.2013.174 
 
Five years after the German legislator decided to change its GmbHG, the Austrian legislator 
has finally brought itself to do as well - at least it looks like this at the moment.  
Examining the proposed modification is quite interesting since Austrian company law and 
especially the GmbHG have always been shaped by German law.175 At the end of the day, 
Austria plans to take a different step now in the forthcoming reform of the GmbH than 
Germany has done: it is intended to lower the legally prescribed minimum capital and not to 
introduce a ”GmbH-light” whithout the requirement of any such capital. 176 
 
The Court´s judicature on the freedom of establishment still plays a crucial role in Austria´s 
decision to change the system now. The indirect impact of the CJEU´s judicature and other 
European influences that have affected Austria´s choice will be examined in this section. 
3.4.1 Competition of systems in Austria - SPE 
While in Germany the discussions about changing the minimum capital requirement were 
carried out after the judgements in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art177, now, when the 
Austrian reform is going to be implemented, the CJEU had time to develop its “opinion” on 
the freedom of establishment further.  
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Even though some scholars argue that the Court has abandoned its former reasoning with 
Cartesio and VALE, the mobility of companies in the European Union is still given and 
consequently the competition of system continues to be a threat to some Member States.178 
Every company established lawfully in its home Member State can still move freely within 
the EU, unless the home state has imposed restrictions on the emigration of companies.179  
 
So, the CJEU`s judicature on the freedom of establishment, with Cartesio and VALE being 
the last judgements in line, still allows entrepreneurs to establish a company in one Member 
State but to have the only seat in another one – with the home Member State´s permission.  In 
Austrian literature these companies are called Scheinauslandsgesellschaften.180 This name 
indicates that entrepreneurs use the foreign legal forms because of their advantages like no 
minimum capital requirement but want to carry out their business exclusively in Austria.  
Of course this would not have been possible before the CJEU´s judgements. Hence, Austria as 
a country following the real seat doctrine and obtaining the highest minimum capital in the 
Union still experiences the competition of systems as a consequence of the Court´s judicature 
on the freedom of establishment to this day.181 
 
It has to be mentioned in this context that in Austria even though Limiteds have been 
established the feared huge mass of Limited-foundations has no happened. However, when 
founders, who chose this legal form, have been asked why they have done so, the main reason 
is the absence of a minimum capital requirement.182  
In addition to this, it has to be kept in mind that the competition for Austria is not just 
composed by completely different foreign legal forms like the Limited, but also by the UG, 
whose regulatory scheme is not so different from the one governing the Austrian GmbH.183 
The Austrian authorities are therefore afraid that more entrepreneurs might decide not to use 
the GmbH but another legal form.184 
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What has enhanced the discourse in Austria even more is not just the already existing 
competition of systems because of the CJEU´s judicature but also the proposal of the 
European Commission to introduce the Societas Privata Europaea (”SPE”).  
The SPE should allow to establish a Union - wide corporation with limited liability that would 
require just € 1,00 as minimum capital which can function as an alternative next to the 
national GmbH.185 The SPE is intended to be used for small and medium sized enterpises but 
could also be applied by bigger companies as well as concerns. It should convince 
entrepreneurs with its low minimum capital requirement and its easy establishment. This legal 
form should be goverened by the same provisions in every Member State based on its own 
regulation.186 On the basis of its supra-nationality, the SPE will be in direct competition with 
the national legal forms.187 
The Member States have not come to a decision as far as the introduction of the SPE is 
concerned till now. Also in this context the biggest problem is the determination of its 
minimum capital requirement. The initial proposal of € 1,00 is heavily rejected by some 
Member States. Now, the alternatives of € 8.000,00 or setting up framework conditions within 
those the states can decide themselves are discussed. Today, it is not sure when and if the SPE 
will really be established.188 Nethertheless, some Member States, like Austria, consider the 
SPE to be a – future –  alternative to the national GmbH.189  
 
In view of the fact that Austria considers the competition of systems to have a tremendous 
influence on the competitivness of the GmbH and due to the possible introduction of the SPE 
in addition to this already existing competition, it is not surprising that discussions about the 
maintenance of the minimum capital requirement have been started. 
3.4.2 Austrian view on the minimum capital requirement 
In order to be able to examine the upcoming reform, a look has to be taken at the current 
opinions on the legally prescribed minimum capital in Austria. 
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The Austrian GmbH has been established in 1906 after the model of the German GmbH. Over 
the years there have been some modifications and additional laws190 but the legal instrument 
of demanding minimum capital has not been changed. 
 
The Austrian law governing the GmbH, the GmbHG, is based on the German one. When 
discussing the advantages or disadvantages of the minimum capital requirement this close 
relationship becomes obvious. Austrian and German scholars basically use the same 
argumentation for and against this legal instrument. 
 
In Austria the voices for the maintenance of the minimum capital requirement are very strong. 
Principally, a similar argumentation for its preservation is used as in Germany. The view that 
it has to be considered as an indicator of seriousness is quite popular: the legally prescribed 
minimum capital is regarded as the least possible form of a founder´s commitment. Just if 
entrepreneurs have to pay a noticeable amount of money the economy can be prevented from 
careless undertakings. Hence, the system as it is at the moment should not be changed.191 
Otherwise the good reputation of the Austrian GmbH which had performed so well in over 
100 years192 would be lost.193 Certainly these loyal proponents of the minimum capital 
requirement are rejecting any changes of the system. 
 
For some of the proponents of the existing system a solution like in Germany seems to be the 
best one. By introducing a “GmbH light”, which is not demanding any minimum capital, the 
reputation of the regular GmbH is not endangered and the level of attractiveness of the 
Austrian system for new founders could be enhanced at the same time.194 Moreover, those in 
favour of such an approach state that a competition with the Limited or any other foreign legal 
form, that requires just € 1,00 as minimum capital, cannot be won by just reducing the actual 
minimum capital requirement.195 
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While for some scholars the introduction of a “GmbH-light” seems to be the perfect solution, 
others consider this as the worst case scenario. Firstly, they argue that this is not a real 
solution to the problem. Secondly, they state that if such a legal form should be established 
anyhow, the whole system of creditor protection would have to be changed. 196 
 
A lot of experts seem to prefer a reduction to € 10.000,00. The supporters of this opinion want 
to stick to the legal instrument of minimum capital requirements and note that paying this 
amount at the beginning of the economic activity can be regarded as a suitable indicator of 
seriousness and guarantee a better position in the competition of systems at the same time.197 
 
The minimum capital requirement is a sensitive issue since it constitutes the core provision of 
creditor protection. The discussion in Austria is as far reaching and controversial as it has 
been in Germany some years ago. In all the opinions about this topic one thing was 
fascinating: the general tenor for a legally prescribed minimum capital is positive. The 
majority of scholars wants to keep this legal instrument. However, even the majority of the 
experts that argues in defence of the maintaining of the highest minimum capital requirement 
in Europe acknowledges that reforms have to be made. Most scholars agree that the 
competition of systems, enhanced by the probable introduction of the SPE, requires a proper 
response, also from Austria.198 In the end, this response is about to be made but will look 
differently than the one Germany chose. 
3.4.3 Planned Reform 
Germany wanted to defeat the spreading of the Limiteds in its territory with the MoMiG in 
2008, by which it introduced the UG next to keeping up its former minimum capital 
requirement for the regular GmbH. 199 In Austria firstly, reforms were considered because of 
the fear that Limiteds would spread as rapidly as in Germany, too. Secondly, later on, it 
should also be avoided that too many UGs would be established.200 Moreover, it was feared 
that also the SPE could become a threat to the Austrian GmbH.201 
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Like in Germany the process of reforming the GmbHG, particularly the parts governing the 
minimum capital requirement, could not be carried out hasty. It took quite some time to make 
the reform plans as concrete as they are now.  
 
In 2006, at a time when Germany was in the middle of the process of finding the right way to 
realise its reform, also discussions in Austria started. At the 16. Austrian Juristentag, the 
scholars agreed, that the inflow of Limiteds required a reaction, which should be constituted 
by the reduction but not the abolishment of the current minimum capital requirement.202 In 
2009, the first draft for the reform was presented. The core provision contained the reduction 
of the legally prescribed minimum capital to € 10.000,00. The implementation of the reform 
was planned to take place until mid 2010.203 However, it did not and three more years passed 
until the presentation of the next plan. Finally, the draft for the GesRÄG has been sent to 
assessment on 22.03.2013 and shall enter into force in the 01.07.2013.204 
The main aim of the GesRÄG is to enhance the attraciveness of the Austrian GmbH in the 
existing competition with foreign legal forms and the possible competition with the SPE.205 
 
In the explanation to the draft of the GesRÄG, it is stated that there exist too possibilities to 
make the GmbH more attractive to founders of new businesses and to enhance its 
competitiveness: the reduction of the minium capital or the introduction of a new legal 
subform of the GmbH without bascially any minimum capital requirement like the UG in 
Germany.206 
The Austrian experts responsible for this draft agreed with the European commission that 
demanding a minimum capital can no longer be regarded as a suitable means of creditor 
protection.207 Still, they could not bring themselves to abandon this legal institute totally. 
Although it can be seen in the discussion described, that lot of experts were in favour of  the 
introduction of a ”GmbH-light”, the argumentation that the minimum capital requirement is 
needed as an indicator of seriousness prevailed.208 The amount of € 10.000,00 was chosen, 
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because a legal comparison has shown that this is a useful amount to indicate this seriousness. 
Moreover, it was also considered an amount that is affordable for founders.209 
 
3.4.4 Assessment of the planned changes 
In the end, the Austrian experts responsible for the draft of the GesRÄG considered the 
reduction of the minimum capital requirement to € 10.000,00 to be more suitable for 
maintaining the function as an indicator of seriousness than introducing another legal form.210 
 
As expected, the reactions to the draft of the GesRÄG have been controversial. The ones that 
are in favour of the introduction of a “GmbH-light” for sure do not consider the lowering of 
the minimum capital to go far enough. The other ones, that have been supporters of the 
reduction, are certainly pleased. The Austrian chamber of commerce for example appreciates 
the proposed modifications and considers them to be the right answer to the existing 
competition of system, especially with relation to Germany and England.211 
3.4.5 Indirect Influence 
Still, in 2013 the influence of the CJEU´s judgements on the freedom of establishment on 
national legislations is intense. Although some scholars argued that with VALE everything 
has changed, like it was described in Chapter 2, this view cannot be supported when taking a 
look at the example of Austria now.  
 
Countries following the real seat doctrine continue to be put in a different situation than they 
have been before the Court´s judicature on the freedom of establishment. The competition of 
systems is still the “motivator” of changes in laws governing limited liability companies 
especially concerning the provisions on minimum capital requirement. Even in the 
explanations to the GesRÄG it is stated the main argument for the need to modify the 
Austrian system is the CJEU´s judicature on the freedom of establishment.212 
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The SPE of course contributed to this competition. It even seemed for a moment that the 
planned introduction of the SPE would stop the reform effort.213 In the end the SPE did not 
stop the reform but influenced it. Some Austrian scholars for example considered the 
introduction of a ”GmbH-light” as a waste of time and energy since it would be at the same 
level as the SPE.214  
It is obvious that the SPE had some impact on the discussion about minimum capital 
requirements in Austria because it is regarded as a future potential competitor. However, 
according to me, this planned new legal form is not the main issue in and definitely not the 
impulse for the discourse. For me, it added just another factor that has to be evaluated in the 
discussion.  
 
To sum up, the discourse about the minimum capital requirement for private limited 
companies started because of the CJEU´s judicature on the freedom of establishment and as 
the example of Austria demonstrates also keeps going on because of it. 
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4 Conclusion 
The influence of the CJEU is wide and far-reaching. How immense the effects of its 
judgements really are, is often not so clearly recognisable. Nevertheless, not just its direct 
statements on or rather decisions about national laws but also the indirect impact of its 
judicature possess the power to change national legislations. 
 
In order to demonstrate this indirect influence the Court´s judgements on the freedom of 
establishment were examined more closely, particularly concerning their impact on countries 
following the real seat doctrine. The example of minimum capital requirements for private 
limited companies in Germany and Austria has been used to demonstrate the indirect impact 
of the Court´s judicature. 
 
As is clear from the discussions described, minimum capital requirements are considered core 
provisions for creditor protection in some countries, like Austria and Germany. The CJEU`s 
judicature on the freedom of establishment exposed these countries and their legal forms to a 
competition of systems which led to discussions about the maintaining of this legal 
instrument. 
 
I do not know whether it is possible to find the right answer in the debate about the necessity 
of minimum capital requirements. At least, it appears to me that there is no solution that is 
able to please all experts.  
However, according to me, what is particularly interesting about this legal discourse is not its 
outcome. I regard the question why such a discussion about a core provision could start at all 
to be more interesting. Germany and Austria basically had, respectively have to deal with the 
same problem: very high minimum capital requirements for their limited liability companies 
in comparison to the other EU Member States.  
As described before, this has not been an issue for a very long time. Both countries had their 
GmbHs for over 100 years without changing the legal instrument of minimum capital 
requirements per se. However, obtaining a high minimum capital requirement turned into a 
problem after the CJEU´s rulings on the freedom of establishment. Germany and Austria who 
are both following the real seat doctrine suddenly felt exposed to a competition of systems 
which did not exist before. Their national GmbHs had to compete with foreign legal forms 
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that did not demand any minimum capital and therefore seemed more attractive to some 
entrepreneurs. This situation was the initiator for the discourse about minimum capital 
requirements. 
 
In Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art it seemed that the CJEU would abandon the seat 
theory completely. The competition of systems started after these judgements and Germany 
began to evaluate the need for a minimum capital requirement as a reaction to this new 
situation. Finally, the discussion led to a modification of the GmbHG by the establishment of 
the UG. 
Five years later, also Austria is about to change its law governing the private limited 
companies although the CJEU´s judicature has developed further and some scholars consider 
Cartesio and VALE as turning points as far as the maintaining of the real seat theory is 
concerned. However, even if the CJEU seems to rule more in favour of this doctrine the 
impact on real seat countries is still the same. The Court´s later judgements on the freedom of 
establishment did not lead to the abandonment of the competition of systems. It is still this 
competition - which is actually a little bit more enhanced than at the time of the German 
reforms - that made Austria decide to reduce its minimum capital requirement. 
So, even if both countries found, or rather are going to find a different solution to the 
problem, it was caused by the same fact. Hence, no matter if pre-Cartesio or post-VALE, the 
indirect influence of the CJEU´s judgements on minimum capital requirements in real seat 
Member States seems to be the same. 
 
The power of the Court´s direct influence on national legislations is obvious and nobody 
would doubt it. However, not just the direct but also the indirect impact of the CJEU´s 
judgements should not be underestimated by anyone. The example of the modifications 
concerning minimum requirements in Germany and Austria illustrates vividly how immense 
even this kind of influence of the CJEU´s judicature can be and especially remains to be over 
time.  
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